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1February 23, 2006 
DRAFT 
 
Public Inputs and Dynamic Producer Behavior: 
Endogenous Growth in U.S. Agriculture1
Alejandro Onofri and Lilyan E. Fulginiti2
Abstract. This paper is an attempt to understand the impact of public R&D and public 
infrastructure on the performance of the U.S. agricultural sector during the last part of the 
twentieth century.  A neoclassical Solow growth model is not sufficient for this understanding 
given the sustained growth performance of the sector.  We base our analysis on a well known 
endogenous growth model, the 'AK model' where nonconvexities are introduced through non-
rival inputs. Based on these models and within the dynamic models that rationalize private 
and public decision making, we have identified three testable hypotheses regarding the 
aggregate agricultural production technology. They are: 1) increasing returns to scale over all 
inputs; 2) positive effect of additional units of public inputs on the long-run demand for 
private capital; and 3) negative impact of public inputs on cost. They are tested using two 
estimation procedures on two data sets for U.S. agriculture.  One, covering the period 1948-
1994, developed by USDA, the other, covering the period 1926-1990, from Thirtle et al.  
Maximum likelihood estimates do not conform to the regularity and behavioral properties of 
the model rendering them unusable for testing these hypotheses.  Bayesian estimates, although 
not totally satisfactory, do not reject the hypotheses after prior imposition of some of the 
regularity conditions. This supports the notion of an important role for public inputs on the 
rapid and sustained growth of the sector.  We calculate that, on average, one additional dollar 
spent on public R&D stock reduces private cost by $6.5, implying a return on these public 
expenses of 190 percent. 
 
JEL Classification: D21, Q16 
 
Keywords: non-rival inputs, endogenous growth, 'AK' models, dynamics, returns to public 
inputs, U.S. agriculture. 
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2PUBLIC INPUTS AND DYNAMIC PRODUCER BEHAVIOR: 
Endogenous Growth in U.S. Agriculture 
I. Introduction 
 
Neoclassical models of growth (Solow, Ramsey) have been widely criticized because 
they cannot explain productivity changes. According to these models, growth is exogenously 
given by an unexplained rate of technical change. As a response, endogenous growth theories 
prove that continuous growth is possible if there are non-rival inputs in production (i.e., inputs 
that can be used by many firms at the same time or by the same firm repeatedly without 
additional cost). In these models, two necessary conditions for endogenous growth are: 
increasing returns to scale over all inputs, and positive impacts of non-rival inputs on the 
returns to investment. The main contribution of this study is to introduce a dynamic model of 
productivity measurement that incorporates public goods (non-rival by definition) as external 
factors to the firms. It also rationalizes the provision of public inputs by a benevolent social 
planner that internalizes their effect. Estimable functions that allow testing the necessary 
conditions for endogenous growth are obtained. 
 
Many other papers have focused on the effects of public goods on private production, 
and most of them have found positive impacts3. For example, Aschauer’s (1989) pioneering 
work estimates a single production function for the U.S. economy including public 
infrastructure as a factor of production. Lynde and Richmond (1992) and Berndt and Hansson 
(1992) have also used duality theory to estimate the role of infrastructure in private production 
in the U.S. and Sweden, respectively. Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) estimate the impacts of 
public capital and research and development (R&D) on the cost structure of twelve U.S. 
manufacturing industries, and Morrison and Schwartz (1996) study the regional effects of 
public infrastructure on the U.S. manufacturing sector. Both of the latter papers adopt a dual 
approach and find, in general, positive effects of public inputs on manufacturing productivity. 
The last paper also finds increasing returns to scale over all inputs (including infrastructure), 
but it does not include R&D. 
 
For the agricultural sector, papers like Antle (1983) and Craig et al. (1997) find 
positive effects of public infrastructure and research on agricultural productivity but their 
approach is based on estimating a single production function. Binswanger et al. (1993) 
estimates the impacts of infrastructure and R&D in India. They consider, in a static 
framework, that public infrastructure investments are regionally allocated toward areas that 
are more productive. Huffman et al. (2002) estimates the impact of R&D and public 
infrastructure for five Midwestern states using a static cost function approach.  They estimate 
a large and negative impact of these variables on cost.  In contrast, the present study presents a 
dynamic model of growth used within the context of a simple endogenous growth model. This 
approach, based on duality theory, maintains private and public rationality and allows 
examination of the impacts of public inputs on producers' and government behavior. 
The model is tested with data for the U.S. agricultural sector. United States 
agricultural productivity has increased at an annual average rate of two percent over the 1948-
1994 period. Some authors have found that productivity growth has been the main factor 
 
3 Exceptions are Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) and Holtz-Eakin (1994). They find insignificant effects of 
public infrastructure on private production. 
3contributing to economic growth of the agricultural sector (Ball et al., 1997). Additionally, the 
provision of public goods in the form of public research, extension, and infrastructure has 
been sizable in this country. In an atomistic environment, these public expenditures are 
traditionally justified because of their low degree of appropriability and high initial costs. 
We ask if permanent changes in government policies have generated permanent changes in 
growth rates of the sector. 
 
Here, theoretically consistent dynamic firm-level demands for inputs that include the 
stocks of public infrastructure and R&D are estimated for U.S. agriculture. The existence of 
economies of scale and the likely positive impact of public inputs on the steady state stocks of 
private capital are tested.  From the assumption of rationality in government behavior, the 
optimal provision of public goods is examined.  The relationship between the public objective 
of a benevolent social planner and that of the private firms allows derivation of an important 
condition that we test: that public inputs should reduce the private costs of production. 
 
There are several other reasons to undertake this study that go beyond the 
understanding of the persistently high rate of growth of productivity in U.S. agriculture.  First, 
the possibility of endogenous growth in the agricultural sector may imply spillovers to other 
sectors and, in particular, may have important effects on the growth of regional economies 
based on agricultural activities. Second, Ball et al. (1997) show the increasing use of materials 
and the decreasing use of labor in the U.S. agricultural sector. By determining the substitution 
or complementarity between public and private inputs, one may explain the findings by Ball et 
al. with respect to this evolution of quantities demanded of private factors. Third, we hope to 
add evidence to the academic debate over the virtues of endogenous growth theories over 
more traditional approaches to understand growth. It will also point towards a powerful role of 
public policies in this process.  Finally, the estimation of shadow prices for public capital and 
R&D stocks may provide an indicator to policy makers of the optimal provision of public 
investment. 
 
This paper develops as follows. Section II presents a summary of the endogenous 
growth theory involving publicly provided goods and the related testable hypotheses. Section 
III introduces a dynamic model in which both the behavior of producers’ and government are 
rationalized. The testable hypotheses are then revisited. Section IV introduces the empirical 
model and section V presents the results. Finally, conclusions are stated in section VI. 
 
II. Growth Theory and Testable Hypotheses 
 
In the neoclassical models of growth (Solow, Ramsey), the rate of growth of per capita 
output is a decreasing function of the per capita stock of private capital. Without technical 
change and with a well-behaved neoclassical production function, the level of per capita 
output converges to a steady state where the growth of per capita private capital eventually 
stops. This result, implied by the assumption of decreasing returns to capital, has been one of 
the major criticisms to these models. 
 
As a response to these empirically unsustainable results, endogenous growth theory 
arose proposing different hypotheses. Some of these theories incorporate into the models the 
reasons for technical change to occur based on the presence of externalities that originate 
nonconvexities. 
4Nonconvexities play an important role in new theories of growth. They are generally 
due to the presence of nonrival goods. Following Romer (1990), nonrivalry can be interpreted 
in two ways. First, nonrival factors of production are valuable “inputs that can be used 
simultaneously in more than one activity.” Under this definition, public goods, like public 
infrastructure for instance, are nonrival inputs that can be used by many producers at the same 
time. Alternatively, one can define a nonrival input as that input that can be used repeatedly in 
the same activity. With this definition, a new chemical process, for example, is an input that 
can be used more than once in the production of a certain product. In this case, nonconvexities 
are intrinsically associated to this input: there is a high cost of producing the first unit, but the 
cost of producing subsequent units is zero. In any case, since the presence of nonrival inputs 
generates nonconvexities, the production function can be characterized by increasing returns 
to scale: 
0with ),N,R(F)N,R(F)N,R(F >=>
where R and N stand for rival input and nonrival inputs, respectively. Thus, if rival and 
nonrival inputs are doubled ( = 2), output is more than doubled. 
 
One of the pioneer studies in the endogenous growth literature has been that by Romer 
(1986). In this paper, Romer specifies a production function F(ki, K, xi), with ki and xi being 
firm-specific inputs (x can be seen as a vector of inputs) and K an input external to the firm, 
like “the level of knowledge” defined as a function of the “firm-specific knowledge” 
(K=g(ki)). If F is increasing in K and linearly homogeneous in ki and xi, a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium is still possible, but the factor ki no longer exhibits diminishing 
returns. Consequently, permanent endogenous growth of output per capita is allowed. 
 
Barro (1990) has developed a similar model where K can be interpreted as the stock of 
public capital (hereafter G). The intuition is that publicly provided capital (like roads, sewer 
capital, etc.) has a positive impact on private production affecting the productivity of the firm-
specific inputs. Public capital is assumed a public input that can be used by additional 
producers without cost. Consequently, total stocks of public goods enter into the production 
function of each individual firm. In this context, two necessary conditions for the 
hypothesized endogenous growth are: existence of increasing returns to scale over all inputs, 
and existence of constant returns to scale over factors that can be accumulated. This second 
condition implies that private capital is continuously accumulated and there is an optimal ratio 
between private to public capital. A weaker requirement, alternative to this condition, would 
be a positive impact of G on the demand for capital. Although not ensuring continuous 
growth, the presence of this nonrival input would imply a positive government contribution to 
growth. 
 
The conditions mentioned above (i.e., increasing returns to scale over all inputs and 
positive impact of public inputs on private capital accumulation) can be rationalized using the 
theory of the firm. The following section introduces a model in which firms respond to 
changes in public inputs provided by a benevolent social planner. Estimable functions that 
allow testing for the hypothesized endogenous growth conditions are then obtained in a model 
that maintains private and public rationality. 
 
5III. The Model 
 
A dynamic dual model of the firm is used to explain growth based on the existence of 
public inputs. As was hypothesized, public goods might have positive effects on firms’ 
production. If the dual problem of the firms is considered, public inputs might reduce cost of 
production given the level of firms’ output. In this manner, increases of public inputs would 
increase firms’ productivity. 
 
The model assumes that economic agents are intertemporal optimizers: firms minimize 
intertemporal costs of production and the government (social planner) maximizes 
intertemporal welfare. Instantaneous adjustment of inputs is not possible because of the 
existence of costs of adjustment. 
 
In their optimizing behavior, firms take public inputs as given. Public inputs are 
considered fixed inputs of production in that they cannot be adjusted by the firm to obtain the 
minimum possible cost. However, the government, behaving as a social planner, observes the 
producers’ surplus and provides public goods to maximize this surplus, subject to the cost of 
providing the public inputs. 
 
The model adopted in this paper assumes that the government knows the payoff 
function of the firms. This assumption implies that the government knows how the firms react 
when public inputs are changed, i.e. the government behaves as a ‘leader’ and optimizes first. 
Then, firms take the level of public inputs as given and choose private inputs such that their 
costs of production are minimized. 
 
The following figure shows the dynamics of behavior of this economy. 
 
G represents the stock of the public input. K is the stock of private capital. Three 
average cost curves (faced by the firms) are shown in the graph. ACS(Gt, Kt) represents a very 
short-run average cost curve when private inputs (capital in this case) and public inputs are 
fixed. ACS(Gt) is the short-run average cost curve when only public inputs are fixed. Finally, 
ACL is the long-run average cost curve when all inputs are adjusted. 
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6At each period t, the firms observe the public input stock G and choose the optimal 
path of investment (I) that allows them to reach the optimal steady state (SS) stock K*. 
Starting at E0 and with a stock of public inputs G0, firms choose an optimal path of I that 
allows the firm to reach K0* at the minimum cost. The firm moves from E0 to E’0. The path is 
adjusted the next period when the stock G1 implies a new SS stock K1*. The firm then moves 
to E1. The two conditions for the hypothesized endogenous growth of the firms can then be 
seen in the graph: 
I. Increasing returns to scale over the long-run average cost curve (ACL): negative slope 
of ACL. 
II. Positive effects of G on the SS stocks of the private capital (i.e. the private input “that 
can be accumulated”): the SS stock of K increases from K0* to K1* when G grows 
from G0 to G1.
More formally, firms solve the following problem: 
t0)t(Z
Z)0(Z
ZIZtosubject 
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(1) 
where C(y, Z, I; G) is the variable cost function; y is the only output; Z is the vector of stocks 
of quasi-fixed inputs; p is the rental price vector corresponding to Z; I is the vector of gross 
changes in quasi-fixed inputs;  is the diagonal matrix containing the depreciation rates of Z; 
G is the vector of public inputs; and  > 0 is the firm’s real rate of discount. It is assumed that 
there is one perfectly variable input whose price (w) is normalized to one.4 Thus, the elements 
of p are relative rental prices. 
Define now J(Z, y, p; G) as the value function that solves problem (1). Assuming that 
C(y, Z, I; G) satisfies the set of regularity conditions (A.1) – (A.6) and J(Z, y, p;G) satisfies 
properties (B1) – (B5) (see Appendix 1), duality between C(y, Z, I; G) and J(Z, y, p; G) can 
be established. 
 
Duality between C(y, Z, I; G) and J(Z, y, p; G):5 any J( Z, y, p; G.) satisfying conditions (B) is 
the value function corresponding to C(y, Z, I; G) that satisfies conditions (A) and is defined by 
 
)]ZI)(G;p,y,Z('JZ'p)G;p,y,Z(J[Max)G;I,Z,y(C zp = (2) 
or 
)]ZI)(G;p,y,Z('JZ'p)G;I,Z,y(C[Min)G;p,y,Z(J zI ++= (3) 
These two equations provide the relationship between the cost function C(y, Z, I; G) 
and the value function J(Z, y, p; G). They allow obtaining the properties of C(y, Z, I; G) in 
terms of the parameters of J(Z, y, p; G) when firms minimize intertemporal costs. Thus, the 
derivative properties that characterize C(y, Z, I; G) can be recovered from the parameters of 
 
4 Given w = 1, the variable cost function is C(1, y, Z, I; G). For simplification, C(1, y, Z, I; G) = C(y, Z, I; G) is 
used. 
5 Epstein (1983). 
7J(Z, y, p; G).6 Assuming rationality of the private decision making process provides guidance, 
in the form of a series of conditions, that need be satisfied by the empirics. In addition the two 
previously mentioned growth conditions can be tested through estimation of parameters of 
J(Z, y, p; G). 
 
Conditions for Endogenous Growth 
1) The impact of G on 
a) The cost function: this is provided by the fifth derivative property explained in 
Appendix 1. The following expression represents this effect: 
)G;p,y,Z(*Z)G;p,y,Z(J)G;p,y,Z(J)G;I,Z,y(C ZGGG
•=
which is the shadow price of G when the firms are out of the SS. At the SS, the 
shadow price is 
)G;p,y,Z(J)G;I,Z,y(C GG =
If this expression is negative, the shadow price of G is positive, meaning that public 
inputs reduce cost of production. 
b) The dynamic demand for private capital: it can be shown that the dynamic demand for 
the quasi-fixed inputs Z can be expressed as 
)]G,p(ZZ)[G,p(M)G;p,y,Z(*Z
_=• (4) 
where )G,p(Z
_
is the SS stock of Z and M(p,G) is a stable adjustment matrix. This 
expression yields a flexible accelerator adjustment path for the stocks Z and is the 
reason for these dynamic models to be called “multivariate flexible accelerator 
models” (Epstein,1983). The form of M(p,G) is determined by the functional form of 
C(y, Z, I); however, only under certain conditions, it can be successfully expressed as 
an explicit function of the parameters of C(y, Z, I).7 The effect of G on the dynamic 
demand for Z can then be decomposed into the effect on the adjustment matrix and the 
effect on the SS stock of Z. The condition for endogenous growth would be for G to 
increase the SS stock of private capital K (one of the quasi-fixed factors of the firms). 
The effect on the adjustment matrix an effect on the speed of adjustment toward the 
SS.  It is still required for this adjustment to be stable. 
 
2) Scale Effects: there must be increasing returns to scale over all factors of production 
(public and private factors). Increasing returns to scale can be evaluated by considering 
the elasticity of cost with respect to output (CY). It is well known in the production 
economics literature that the elasticity of cost with respect to output is the dual expression 
of the elasticity of scale (y): cy=1/ y.8 When the elasticity of cost with respect to output 
is less than one, firms exhibit economies of scale. However, in the presence of factors 
external to the firm, some adjustments should be made in order to obtain cy. Morrison and 
Schwartz (1996) show how to adjust the elasticity of cost with respect to output when 
 
6 See Appendix 1 for the derivative properties. 
7 See Epstein (1983) for details. 
8 See Chambers (1988) for details. 
8there are quasi-fixed inputs in a static cost minimization framework.9 This approach is 
used here for the case of intertemporal optimization.10 
Define the shadow price of the public input PG = PG(Z, y, p; G). This shadow price 
can be interpreted as an “inverse demand” for the public input. Solving for G, given PG, 
gives the direct shadow demand for G that can be substituted into (4) to get 
)]ZI))(p,y,Z,P(G;p,y,Z(J
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G
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Taking the derivative with respect to y, we obtain the adjusted effect of output on cost 
when the ‘shadow demand’ for G also changes with firms’ output: 
)p,y,Z,P(G)J*ZJ(*ZJJy
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At the SS, this expression becomes 
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Completing elasticities gives the following equation 
  +=
G
GYCGCY
A
CY  (7) 
which is the elasticity of cost with respect to output adjusted for the presence of public 
inputs. Note that CG is the elasticity of cost with respect to external factors, and GY is the 
elasticity of “demand for external factors” with respect to output. This demand elasticity 
should be interpreted as a long-run one representing the change in external factors 
necessary to maintain the firm on the envelope long-run average cost curve after a change 
in output. Therefore, if ACY is less than one, then there are increasing returns to scale over 
all inputs. 
 
Government Behavior 
As already mentioned, the government behaves as a benevolent social planner. It 
provides public inputs to maximize welfare (producers’ and consumers’ surpluses less the cost 
of providing public inputs). A small open economy is assumed, so the output price is given. 
 
9 The approach is based on Le Chatelier principle. Taking the derivative with respect to Y on both sides of the 
identity CA(P, Pg, Y)  C(P,G(P,Pg,Y),Y) gives 
 


+
=
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Finally, completing elasticities gives 
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A
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10 Stefanou (1989) extends the concept of scale elasticity to a dynamic framework when the firm is not 
necessarily in steady state.  He does not include external factors. 
9Assuming that public inputs do not affect utility of consumers, the problem of the government 
is reduced to the maximization of producers’ surplus. Then, in a dynamic model, the 
government solves the following problem 
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where J(y, Z, p; G) is the value function of the firms that comes from their intertemporal cost 
minimization problem; Ig is the investment in public inputs which stocks are given by vector 
G; AC(Ig) is the government’s adjustment cost of G; g is the diagonal matrix containing the 
depreciation rates of G; r is the rental price of G; and  is the government’s rate of discount. 
The existence of adjustment costs is justified by the multiple activities the government does 
with given resources. Increasing Ig means that the government must reallocate funds and 
resources used in the provision of some other public goods, like goods that provide utility to 
consumers or are inputs for producers in other sectors. This reallocation of resources implies 
that some resources are wasted in the process. This loss can then be modeled as an adjustment 
cost.11 
Define Jg(p, Z, y; r, G) as the government’s value function that solves (8). Assuming 
that J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) satisfies conditions (C.1) – (C.6) and Jg(p, Z, y; r,G) satisfies conditions (D.1) – (D.5) (see Appendix 2), duality between J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) and Jg(p, Z, 
y; r, G) can be established. 
 
Duality between J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) and Jg(p, Z, y; r, G): any Jg(p, Z, y; r, G) satisfying 
conditions (D) is the value function corresponding to J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) that satisfies conditions (C) and is defined by 
)]GI)(G,r,p,y,Z('JG'r)G,r,p,y,Z(J[Max)I(AC)G;p,y,Z(J gggGgrg =+  (9) 
or 
)]GI)(G,r,p,y,Z('J)I(ACG'r)G;p,y,Z(J[Min)G,r,p,y,Z(J gggGgI
g
g
+++= (10) 
 
These two expressions provide the relationship between J(Z, y, p; G), the value function of the 
firms, and Jg(p, Z, y; r, G), the value function of the government. They allow expressing the 
parameters of J(Z, y, p; G) in terms of the parameters of Jg(p, Z, y; r, G) and vice versa, when 
the government maximizes intertemporal welfare by minimizing producers’ cost. Thus, the 
derivative properties that characterize J(Z, y, p; G) can be recovered from the parameters of 
Jg(p, Z, y; r, G).12 It is one of these properties (D2 (ii)) that we use as a basis to expect and 
maintain the negative impact of public inputs on costs. 
 
11 Note that assuming the objective functions of consumers and producers are separable with respect to the 
objective function of problem (8), the government can decide the optimal provision of different public goods 
separately. 
12 See Appendix 2 for these derivative properties. 
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IV. Empirical Implementation 
 
This section presents the empirical implementation of the model introduced above. 
Ideally, having data on r, the optimal path of Ig could be estimated. Nevertheless, the 
contribution of public capital and public R&D to U.S. agricultural growth and the conditions 
for the hypothesized endogenous growth can still be tested through estimation of the firms’ 
demands for private inputs. Adopting a flexible functional form for the value function of the 
firms, all parameters of interest can be recovered from the estimation of the dynamic demands 
for private quasi-fixed inputs and the demand for the variable input. 
 
The model presented above is tested using two data sets.13 The first data set covers the 
period 1948 – 1994 and in large part consists of the one developed by USDA based on the 
recommendations for consistent measurement and aggregation of the AAEA task force on 
statistics. Variables needed for estimation include quantity indexes of capital (K), labor (L), 
materials (M), and output (Y); implicit prices of the three inputs; and stocks of public inputs 
(public capital (G) and R&D (R)).14 K is an aggregate measure of capital and land. Capital 
and labor are assumed quasi-fixed inputs, while materials are the only variable input.15 Output 
is an index of all crops and livestock products. Public capital stocks are values of federal, 
state, and local structures. Public R&D stocks are constructed from R&D spending using 
Chavas and Cox’s method (1992).16 We will refer to this as Ball's data set. 
 
The second data set, from Thirtle et al., covers the period 1926–1990 and is provided 
to the authors with the purpose of comparative examination17 with results to be presented at 
the IX European Efficiency and Productivity Analysis Workshop to meet in Brussels in June 
2005.18 The same aggregate variables are included.  Output is an aggregate of all crops and 
livestock products. K is an aggregate of capital and land. Public R&D stocks are constructed 
from the R&D spending provided by Thirtle et al. using the same method as in the previous 
data set. As this data set does not have an aggregate for materials, the fertilizer index is used 
along with the expenditures on materials for 1967 from Ball's to obtain the variable input 
series.  Public infrastructure has been added to this data set and it is the same variable, 
extended, as described above.  We will refer to this as Thirtle's data set. 
 
13 Table with data sets and graphs for each variable are found in Appendix 4. 
14 See Ball et al. (1997) for details on all agricultural data. Public capital stocks are from Survey of Current 
Business and include buildings, highways, streets, sewer structures etc. Military structures are excluded. Public 
R&D spending is from Alston and Pardey (1996). 
15 The adoption of materials as a variable factor in agricultural production is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies, for example, Vasavada and Chambers (1986), Luh and Stefanou (1991, 1993). 
16 With this method, the stock for a given year is constructed as a weighted sum of the last thirty years of 
expenditures, in which the weights follow an inverted ‘V’ pattern. Huffman and Evenson’s (1989) methodology, 
which consists of a trapezoidal pattern of thirty-five years of expenditures, was also tried. Results show no 
significant differences. 
17 This data set was also offered  for modeling purposesto Professor Quirino Paris and Professor Rolf Färe. 
18 See Thirtle et al (2002) for details on the data set.  Public capital stocks have been added to this data set and 
are the same as in Ball's data set.  Quantities were obtained by multiplying the indexes by the expenditures for 
1967 obtained from Ball's data set.  Prices are implicit.  The materials variable was obtained by multiplying the 
expenditures from Ball for 1967 by the fertilizer index from Thirtle. Dr. Stefanou provided a data series that 
includes 1910-1990 but due to lack of information on infrastrucuture before 1925 plus the need to construct a 
stock of R&D capital reduced the length of the data set we worked with. 
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Consider the following normalized quadratic value function:19 
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This is a second order Taylor series expansion of J in (P, Z, Q), where Z is the vector of quasi-
fixed factors, P is the corresponding vector of normalized rental prices, and Q is the vector of 
output and public inputs; Ai is a 1x7 vector of first order parameters and Bij is a 7x7 matrix of 
parameters; a0 is a scalar parameter. Then, the vectors P’, Z’, and Q’ are equal to 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ];QZP YRG';LK';PP' LK ===
where PK and PL are the prices of capital and labor, respectively, normalized by the price of 
materials. 
 
The dynamic demands for quasi-fixed inputs are then20,21 
 
]),,(J)[,,(J),,(* p1pz ZQZPQZPQZPZ = 
•
(12a) 
 
and the demand for the variable input (X*) is calculated from 
 
*Z]J'p)Q,Z,P(J[]P)Q,Z,P(J)Q,Z,P(J[)Q,Z,P(*X PZ'z'p
•= (13a) 
 
In terms of the postulated value function, (12a) and (13a) become 
 
b)12()(* NQPBBZBuHZ PPPZPZ +++=
•
b)13(*][]
a[*X 0
ZBQ'BZ'AQBQ'2
1
QBZ'ZBZ'2
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'
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'
ZQQ
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'
Q
'
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+++++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19 Other studies that have used second-order expansions to approximate the value function in the agricultural 
sector include Vasavada and Chambers (1982, 1986), Vasavada and Ball, Howard and Shumway (1988, 1989), 
Taylor and Monson, Luh and Stefanou (1991, 1993, 1996), Fousekis and Stefanou, Lansink and Stefanou.  
20 To clarify notation, subscripts in the value function J denote gradient vectors. B and A are matrices of 
parameters. 
21 See Appendix 1 for derivation. 
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where PPZ ABH = , PQPZ BBN = , and u is a 2x2 identity matrix. Note that equations (12b) 
constitute the flexible accelerator with constant adjustment coefficients and can be rewritten 
as in Equation (4) 
)],([),,(*
_
QPZZMQPZZ =• (4b) 
where 
)( PZBuM =
][)( 1
_
NQPBBHBuZ PPPZPZ ++= 
_
Z being the steady state values of private quasi-fixed inputs. 
 
The model until now has been described in terms of continuous time. For estimation 
purposes, however, a discrete approximation to 
•
Z must be used. Z-1 being the lag of Z, (12b) 
can be expressed as 
 
c)12()( NQPBBZBuuHZ PPPZ1-PZ ++++=
Joint estimation of (12c) and (13b) gives all the parameters needed for testing the effects of 
public inputs on firms’ costs, steady state stocks of capital, and scale.22,23 
V. Results 
 
With three private inputs, estimation of the system (12c)-(13b) implies joint estimation 
of three equations: two dynamic demands (for labor and capital) and the demand for the 
variable input. Additionally, the theoretical model implies that public inputs are 
simultaneously determined by P, Z and Y. Therefore, instrumental variables for the public 
inputs must be used. Accordingly, predicted values of G and R were then adopted for 
estimation of (12c)-(13b) by iterative nonlinear seemingly unrelated regressions (nonlinear 
 
22 This estimation assumes that farmers expect the current input prices to prevail in the future. In this way, 
optimization plans are revised each period when new information is obtained (i.e., when farmers observe the new 
prices). 
23 Note that the theory presented here is a theory of the firm. Nevertheless, the data used for estimation is highly 
aggregated. Consistent linear aggregation would require 
,)R,G,Y,Z,P(J)R,G,Y,Z,P(J
i ii
=
,ZZ
i i
= and =
i i
YY
where the sum is across firms. The linear aggregation is over private quasi-fixed stocks and output because they 
are different across firms. For public inputs, however, this is not required because they are non-rival by 
definition: the same input (as long as they are not local public goods) can be used by many producers at the same 
time. Hence, for the quadratic value function presented above, consistent aggregation across firms requires 
linearity in Z and Y, i.e., JZZ = BZZ = 0, JZY = BZY = 0, and JYY = byy = 0, where BZY is a partition matrix of [ ]ZYZRZGZQ BBBB = , and byy is one element of BQQ. For the estimation presented below aggregation 
conditions were not imposed. When those conditions are imposed, there is no qualitative change in the results. 
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ITSUR)24 first and then by a Bayesian procedure.   These procedures are used in both data 
sets, Ball's covering the 1948-1994 period and Thirtle's covering the 1926-1990 period.25 
As a reminder, the three hypotheses to be tested are: 
1) The shadow price of public inputs is positive, meaning that public inputs reduce 
cost of production; 
2) public inputs increase the steady state stock of private capital K; and 
3) there must be increasing returns to scale over all factors of production (public and 
private factors). 
 
a. ITSUR Estimates. 
 
Table 1A presents the parameter estimates for Ball's data set. Estimated shadow prices 
of public infrastructure and public R&D by decade are presented in Table 2A. A positive 
shadow price implies that the corresponding public input reduces agricultural costs of 
production. While positive shadow prices of public research were obtained for the whole 
sample period, shadow prices of infrastructure were all negative. Table 4A shows long-run 
impacts of the public inputs on the private inputs.  While R&D increases the stock of private 
capital, infrastructure decreases it.  In table 5A we see that the third hypotheses is not 
confirmed either as our estimates indicate decreasing returns to scale in all inputs. 
 
Table 1C presents the parameter estimates of the ITSUR estimation using Thirtle’s data 
set.26 Estimated shadow prices of public infrastructure and public R&D by decade are 
presented in Table 2C. Positive shadow prices of public research were obtained for all periods 
but the 1951-1960 period; in contrast, shadow prices of infrastructure were all negative. 
Estimates of long-run impacts of R&D and infrastructure on private capital are seen on Table 
4C.  The elasticity of demand of private capital with respect to R&D indicates that in steady 
state, an additional unit of R&D results in an increase in demand of private capital while the 
opposite is true for infrastructure.  Table 5C shows the estimated returns to scale for this data 
set.  It indicates increasing returns to scale during the whole period giving support to the third 
hypotheses of our model.  Table 6 summarizes these results. 
 
The necessary conditions presented in Appendix 1 and other regularity conditions of 
the economic theory can be checked using the parameter estimates, some are checked globally 
and others need to be to be checked locally at each data point. A summary of these checks is 
found in Table 8. These maximum likelihood estimates violate some of the theoretical 
conditions. 
 
b. Bayesian Estimates. 
 
In order to obtain reliable estimates consistent with the economic theory of the firm, 
new estimations imposing a set of required conditions were performed. Some restrictions 
 
24 Instruments include total U.S. population, number of non-farm workers, interest rate of federal bonds, and total 
non-agricultural exports. 
25 SAS code is found in Appendix 6. 
26 To make the results comparable to those from Ball’s data set, implicit price indexes were constructed using 
Ball’s 1967 expenditures. Quantity indexes were normalized by setting the 1967 value equal to one (Appendix 
4). 
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imply the local imposition of inequality constraints, that is, the restrictions must be imposed at 
each data point.27 One way of doing this is using Bayesian estimation to introduce the desired 
conditions as prior beliefs. 
 
Bayesian estimation entails calculation of the joint posterior distribution of the 
parameters. Analytical calculation of that distribution is, however, not possible, and sampling 
algorithms are generally used to simulate that joint posterior distribution. Different algorithms 
have been developed. This study follows the Metro-Hastings (MH) algorithm, a Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation method that has already been used by Griffiths et al. 
(1999), O’Donnell et al. (1999) and O'Donnell (2002) in previous empirical economic studies. 
 
As other sampling algorithms, the MH simulation method consists of generating draws 
of the parameters of interest from their conditional distribution. Because some restrictions 
need to be imposed in this case, the algorithm contains an accept–reject step in which new 
draws are included in the sample if those conditions are satisfied. In this way, the estimation is 
constrained to the parameter space that is consistent with economic theory. Additionally, 
iterations followed the process in which each random draw was conditioned on the last draw. 
After a certain number of iterations, that process converges to a random sample from the joint 
posterior distribution. The MH parameter estimates are then the mean of that random 
sample.28 
Estimated parameters are presented in Table 1B. Table 2B presents the shadow prices 
of public infrastructure and research by decade and their respective standard deviations. The 
shadows are positive for all decades and most of them are significantly different from zero. 
This is interpreted as a positive contribution of public inputs to growth of the US agricultural 
sector, supporting the first hypothesis. 
 
Tables 3B to 5B show the short- and long-run elasticities of demand and the 
elasticities of cost with respect to output. Estimates of the long-run elasticities of demand 
indicate that, while infrastructure has had positive impacts on private capital accumulation, 
public research has substituted for private capital. Finally, elasticities of cost with respect to 
output, even after adjusting for the presence of public inputs, are larger than one, meaning that 
the U.S. agricultural sector has exhibited decreasing returns to scale, contrary to the postulated 
endogenous growth condition. 
 
Bayesian estimates of the parameters using Thirtle's data set can be seen in Table 1D.  
Table 2D presents the shadow prices of public infrastructure and research by decade and their 
respective standard errors. The shadows for public infrastructure are significantly positive for 
all decades. Those for public R&D are significantly positive from 1941 to 1950, and from 
1961 to 1980.  These estimates support the first hypotheses of the theory.  An interesting 
calculation here is possible.  These results indicate that, on average, an additional dollar spent 
on public R&D stocks will reduce costs by 6.5 dollars.  If one assumes a thirty year impact of 
such an investment it means that one millon dollars of R&D expenses have induced cost 
savings with a present value of 2.9 millions dollars, at a 5% discount rate.  This implies a rate 
of returns to public R&D investments of 190%.   The same calculation for investments in 
 
27 Diewert and Wales (1987) show that, to impose those conditions globally, non-flexible functional forms must 
be adopted. 
28 A detailed explanation of this Bayesian estimation method is presented in Griffiths et al. (1999) and O’Donnell 
et al. (1999). Appendix 3 presents a brief description. 
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public infrastructure give a far less impressive estimate of the rate of returns of approximately 
1%. 
 
Tables 3D to 5D show the short- and long-run elasticities of demand and the 
elasticities of cost with respect to output. Estimates of the short-run elasticities of demand 
indicate that, in general, public inputs do not affect private inputs. Long-run estimates, 
however, show that both public infrastructure and public R&D have had positive impacts on 
private capital accumulation, which is consistent with our hypothesis. Although these 
elasticities are significantly positive, they are very small. The larger estimated impact is in the 
1981-1990 period: for every 10% increase in the stock of public infrastructure or public R&D, 
private capital increases about 0.35%. 
 
Finally, elasticities of cost with respect to output (second column of Table 5D) show 
that, except for the 1981-1990 period, the U.S. agricultural sector has exhibited increasing 
returns to scale in private inputs. That is, these elasticities are less than one even before 
adjusting for public inputs. This table also shows that additional units of infrastructure and 
R&D decrease cost (third and fifth column of Table 5D). The cross elasticities between public 
inputs and output although not significantly different from zero, are of a very large magnitude.  
When they are used to calculate the augmented scale elasticity the results are inconsistent with 
economic theory as they indicate that additional output results on lower costs.  Table 7 
summarizes these results. 
 
The MH estimation using Ball's data set was first done imposing the required 
conditions on all data points. In this case, no draw satisfying all the conditions could be 
obtained, i.e. the parameter space that satisfies the restrictions was empty. The conditions 
were then relaxed and, due to potential measurement errors, they were required to be satisfied 
only at 80% percent of the observations (Atkinson and Dorfman (2001)). Since this relaxation 
was not enough to get a nonempty set, the conditions implied by the Euler equations and 
adjustment costs were not imposed.29 Table 1B shows then the MH parameter estimates 
without imposing these two conditions. 
 
As done with Ball’s data set, Bayesian estimates of the parameters using Thirtle's data 
set were first obtained with imposition of all required conditions on all data points. In this 
case, no draw satisfying all the conditions could be obtained, i.e. the parameter space that 
satisfies the restrictions was again empty. The MH estimation was then relaxed by imposing 
only concavity of the value function and monotonicity in public inputs. Table  9  summarizes 
the violations by both set of estimates.30 
c. Results from other studies. 
 
A preliminary look at the results obtained by other researchers using similar procedures 
and data for U.S. agriculture indicate that Luh and Stefanou (1991, 1993) as well as Vasavada 
and Chambers, and Vasavada and Ball's estimates also reject the theoretical curvature 
conditions.  It is not obvious in these papers what they find in terms of the monotonicity 
restrictions.  Luh and Stefanou (1996) uses two data sets, one of which is a precursor of Ball's 
data set used in our paper, to test the hypotheses derived from a dynamic dual model with 
 
29 This was determined by trial and error examination of the conditions. It was found that the Euler equation and 
adjustment cost conditions were the conditions more difficult to be satisfied. 
30 Appendix 5 includes a discussion of other diagnostic tests run on these data as well as potential extensions of 
the analysis. 
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non-static expectations.  Tests of the properties of the value function estimated indicate 
rejection of monotonicity and curvature for both data sets, consistent with our results. They 
question the robustness of the aggregate data "to allow our models to capture the structure of 
the decision-making environment" (page 1002). 
 
Among the concepts estimated by these authors, the relative speed of adjustment of the 
inputs to their long run steady state level is one we can readily compare to our results.  Our 
results, as well as the results in all four papers mentioned indicate that capital adjusts faster 
than labor, as seen in Table 10. 
 
Returns to scale can also be compared to the estimates in Luh and Stefanou (1991) and 
Luh and Stefanou (1993) having in mind that their estimates include disequilibrium terms 
while ours are at the steady state.  In the first paper, these authors report decreasing returns to 
scale on private inputs in U.S. agriculture. In the second paper, that includes potential 
nonconvexities given by 'learning-by doing', they report decreasing returns evolving into 
increasing returns by the end of their data period.  Maximum likelihood as well as Bayesian  
estimates from Ball's data set indicate decreasing returns to scale in both private only and 
private and public inputs. Maximum likelihood as well as the Bayesian estimates from 
Thirtle's data, estimate increasing returns from all factors, public and private,  as well as for 
private factors.  It should be noted that Luh and Stefanou's as well as our maximum likelihood 
estimates of scale are obtained from 'badly behaved' technologies. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
This paper is an attempt to understand the impact of public R&D and public 
infrastructure on the performance of the U.S. agricultural sector during the last part of the 
twentieth century.  We ask if public policy could have been responsible for the sustained 
growth of the sector or if it just had a one time level effect. Given this sustained growth, a 
traditional neoclassical Solow growth model is not sufficient for the analysis.  We have based 
our analysis on a well known endogenous growth model, the 'AK model' where 
nonconvexities are explained by the presence of non-rival inputs.  We tried to keep true to the 
intrinsic nature of the growth process by using a dynamic model of behavior. 
 
We have modeled the private decision making process when some private inputs are 
quasi-fixed and some inputs are public.  In this context we have identified the conditions for 
sustained growth by deriving the impact of the non-rival inputs on the firm's objective 
(derivative property), on the dynamic demand for quasi-fixed factors (their steady state as 
well as their adjustment), and on returns to scale (extended Le Chatelier). 
 
We have modeled the public decision making process in the provision of public inputs 
as that of a benevolent social planner whose objective is to maximize producers' surplus.  We 
examined the behavioral properties implied by such model of public behavior and derived an 
optimal provision of public goods consistent with such an objective. We show that when the 
government maximizes intertemporal welfare by minimizing producers' cost it is possible to 
recover properties that characterized public behavior from those that characterize private 
behavior.  We use these results to identify behavioral properties related to the rationality in the 
provision of public inputs, one of them being the expectation that endogenous prices for these 
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inputs be non-negative.  This is the property that, jointly with the derivative property of 
private decision makers, allows identification of the sign in this relationship to be used as a 
testable hypothesis. 
 
In contrast to other studies (for instance, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) and Morrison 
and Schwartz (1996)), this paper rationalizes the public provision of non-rival inputs. 
Although Binswanger et al. (1993) and Huffman et al. (2002) have considered the public 
provision of infrastructure, they have done so using a static approach.  The closest analysis, in 
spirit and method, would be that of Luh and Stefanou (1993) who introduced learning-by-
doing as a source of growth in U.S. agriculture.  
 
Theoretical analysis has allowed us to identify three behavioral hypotheses that are 
testable. They are: 1) increasing returns to scale over all inputs (private and public); 2) 
positive effect of additional units of public inputs on the long-run demand for private capital; 
and 3) negative impact of public inputs on cost. 
 
These hypotheses were tested using two data sets for U.S. agriculture.  One, covering 
the period 1948-1994, was developed by USDA following the guidelines of the AAEA 
taskforce on statistics with the objective of obtaining consistent indexes.  The other, covering 
the period 1926-1990, was constructed by Thritle et al. A flexible functional form was 
adopted for the value function of the firm that included public inputs. The derived demand for 
two quasi-fixed factors, labor and private capital, and one variable factor, materials, were 
obtained and fitted using two different methods.  These are a maximum likelihood estimator, 
the iterative non-linear seemingly unrelated procedure; and a Bayesian estimator from Griffith 
et al. (1999). 
 
Using the parameters estimated the three hypotheses derived from the theory were 
tested.  We learned that the maximum likelihood estimates from USDA's data set did not 
support any of the three hypotheses.  We also learned that these estimates did not conform to 
the regularity nor behavioral conditions of the hypothesized behavior, rendering us unable to 
test the hypotheses.  These results are consistent with those of other studies (Vasavada and 
Chambers, Vasavada and Ball, Luh and Stefanou (1996)) that have estimated dynamic (as 
well as static) behavior with aggregate data.  The maximum likelihood estimates from 
Thirtle's data supported the first hypothesis, that of increasing returns to scale, but did not 
support the other two.  These estimates also do not conform to the regularity and behavioral 
properties implied by economic theory. 
 
We then used a Bayesian approach to impose some of the regularity and behavioral 
conditions on estimation.  We relaxed the constraints that seemed binding, the Euler equation 
and the adjustment cost conditions.  We learned that when using the USDA data set, only the 
third hypothesis was satisfied, indicating that additional units of R&D as well as public 
infrastructure have reduced private cost. It seems that for this aggregate data set we need to 
impose all the behavioral and regularity conditions to obtain meaningful estimates. These 
results support that of other studies (O'Donnell et al., O'Donnell) that have used this 
estimation approach with a static framework on some version of this data set.  Bayesian 
estimates using Thirtle et al. data set seem consistent with all three hypotheses for endogenous 
growth in U.S. agriculture.  That is, we find evidence of positive effects of public inputs on 
the steady state level of private capital, positive endogenous prices for R&D and public 
infrastructure and increasing returns to scale. The estimate of return to scale, though, seems 
inconsistent with economic theory and intuition as it indicates, on average, a negative 
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marginal cost. The estimates that support the third hypothesis, that of positive shadow prices 
for public inputs, give an interesting insight.  They indicate that, on average, an additional 
dollar spent on public R&D stocks will reduce costs by 6.5 dollars.  This implies a rate of 
returns to public R&D investments of 190%.   The same calculation for investments in public 
infrastructure gives a far less impressive estimate of the rate of returns of approximately 1%. 
 
A note of caution seems necessary.   There are other theoretical, structural, and 
econometric modeling issues that we have not considered.  We have not modeled 
expectations, nor uncertainty in the production process.  We have not statistically tested for 
specification error.  We have not checked for endogeneity of prices or output that might 
matter at this level of aggregation. We have not included private R&D nor extension 
expenditures. We have not considered human capital formation as an external factor when we 
believe that it is probably one of the most important factors affecting growth of this sector. 
We have not attempted to follow our model more strictly by simultaneously estimating the 
full public decision process as well as the private decision process. A number of econometric 
issues were described in detail in Appendix 5. 
 
It is important, though, to separate the theoretical from the econometric aspects of this 
paper.  This paper has extended a well known endogenous growth model that explains 
sustained growth through provision of public R&D and infrastructure, non-rival production 
inputs. The extension has been to model private and public behavior within a dynamic context 
so as to derive three testable hypotheses from the theory. These are derivations of general 
application. The theory was used to understand the role of public inputs on the sustained 
growth of the U.S. agricultural sector.  In order to do so we use aggregates of outputs and 
inputs for the sector.  We find some evidence of support of these hypotheses but we encounter 
a series of problems as estimates are not always consistent with the postulates of economic 
theory.  In this sense this study supports the conclusions of many others that have used 
aggregate data to understand the decision making process.  We join Luh and Stefanou (1996) 
in concluding that "Nevertheless, it is disturbing that two data series purporting to measure the 
production decisions by agents within the same sector present contradictory evidence…" 
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Table 1A 
Parameter Estimates, Ball's data set 
 
Parameter Estimate t Value Parameter Estimate t Value
hk -0.05576 -0.66ag -0.00003 -0.41
bpkk 0.142348 3.66ar -0.02087 -0.40
bplk 0.16427 1.32ay 481.825 1.52
bpkL -0.04882 -3.76bkk -6.57309 -0.60
bplL 0.244829 5.25bkL -15.7573 -2.78
bpkpk -2.13166 -2.21bkg -6.87E-06 -0.80
bpkpl 4.332687 1.89bkr 0.015036 1.65
bplpl -26.9784 -2.85bky -95.7818 -3.13
nkg 8.10E-08 3.76bLL -6.57994 -1.26
nkr -0.0001 -6.01bLg 3.48E-06 0.27
nky 0.205884 3.10bLr -0.00568 -0.54
hl 0.346815 1.39bLy -18.3036 -0.66
nlg -1.66E-08 -0.28bgg 1.29E-11 0.37
nlr 9.21E-06 0.18bgr -1.37E-08 -0.61
nly -0.0178 -0.10bgy 0.000049 0.51
a0 -268.873 -1.76brr 5.01E-06 0.28
ak 105.181 2.67bry 0.019253 0.33
aL 47.76673 1.51byy 482.802 1.30
Equation Adj R-Sq. D-W     
Qk 0.975 1.98    
QL 0.996 2.05    
Qm 0.798 1.96      
Table 2A 
Shadow Prices based on ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade, Ball's Data Set 
 
Decade P*g P*r 
1949-1959 -4.00E-08 8.68E-04
1960-1969 -3.40E-07 7.15E-04
1970-1979 -8.20E-07 8.08E-04
1980-1989 -1.29E-06 1.35E-03
1990-1994 -1.15E-06 1.42E-03
1949-1994 -7.28E-07 1.03E-03
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Table 3A 
Short-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods - ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade, Ball's Data Set 
 
Decade EKG_SR EKR_SR ELG_SR ELR_SR EMG_SR EMR_SR 
1949-1959 -0.0032 0.00163 0.00573 -0.00678 -0.19251 0.34572
1960-1969 -0.00593 0.00229 0.01569 -0.01409 -0.34502 0.49375
1970-1979 -0.01534 0.00492 0.05827 -0.04354 -3.07294 5.80969
1980-1989 -0.03504 0.01594 0.16666 -0.17651 -1.70414 5.23461
1990-1994 -0.05688 0.03242 0.26842 -0.35618 -1.49635 3.71132
1949-1994 -0.023278 0.01144 0.102954 -0.11942 -1.362192 3.119018
Table 4A 
Long-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods - ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade 
 
Decade EKG_LR EKR_LR ELG_LR ELR_LR EMG_LR EMR_LR 
1949-1959 -0.0052 0.0015 -0.0494 0.0582 -0.0542 -0.377 
1960-1969 -0.0093 0.0021 -0.1214 0.1086 0.0562 -0.1892 
1970-1979 -0.0227 0.0042 -0.469 0.3491 0.7331 -0.3488 
1980-1989 -0.0543 0.0143 -1.0949 1.1555 1.798 -1.3611 
1990-1994 -0.0874 0.0289 -1.7906 2.3675 2.4069 -2.9955 
1949-1994 -0.03578 0.0102 -0.70506 0.80778 0.988 -1.05432 
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Table 5A 
Adjusted Elsticity of Cost with Respect to Output 
ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade, Ball's Data Set 
 
Decade cy cg gy cr ry Acy
1949-1959 6.0191 0.0162 -11.6249 -0.3326 -12.7337 10.0654 
1960-1969 3.3421 0.1955 -7.1423 -0.2877 -10.2991 4.9092 
1970-1979 1.6886 0.9398 -3.0628 -0.5372 -5.3083 1.6617 
1980-1989 2.9251 2.7906 -1.6174 -2.4054 -1.9774 3.168 
1990-1994 5.0124 4.2069 -1.3134 -5.3131 -1.2816 6.2965 
1949-1994 3.79746 1.6298 -4.95216 -1.7752 -6.32002 5.22016 
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Table 1B 
Bayesian Parameter Estimates, Ball's Data Set 
Parameter Estimate t Value Parameter Estimate t Value 
hk -0.05068 -2.06 ag 0.000032 1.76
bpkk 0.252834 13.34 ar -0.01231 -1.19
bplk -0.05284 -16.27 ay -259.881 -1.70
bpkL 0.415566 2.89 bkk -0.8161 -0.37
bplL 0.178916 6.93 bkL 2.563959 1.84
bpkpk -1.49199 -2.12 bkg 2.41E-06 0.92
bpkpl 4.119652 5.28 bkr -0.00177 -0.80
bplpl -38.4536 -5.33 bky 15.13473 1.68
nkg -1.27E-09 -0.22 bLL 1.751193 0.90
nkr 2.63E-06 0.59 bLg -0.00001 -1.83
nky -0.0221 -2.75 bLr 0.009502 1.90
hl 0.612025 3.33 bLy 20.56857 1.31
nlg 3.80E-09 0.19 bgg 2.77E-11 1.79
nlr -3.5E-05 -1.41 bgr -8.65E-08 -9.44
nly 0.155178 2.19 bgy -0.00002 -1.55
a0 134.2401 1.59 brr 8.61E-06 1.97
ak -19.6675 -1.88 bry -0.00926 -1.02
aL -22.1636 -1.30 byy 1274.933 9.22
Table 2B 
Shadow Prices of Public Inputs 
Bayesian Estimates 
Average By Decade, Ball's Data Set 
Decade P*g P*r 
1949-1959 8.00E-07 4.38E-04
(-2.00E-07) (-2.29E-04)
1960-1969 5.00E-07 1.43E-03
(-3.00E-07) (-2.05E-04)
1970-1979 1.00E-06 4.40E-03
(-6.00E-07) (-4.76E-04)
1980-1989 4.80E-06 9.48E-03
(-1.10E-06) (-9.77E-04)
1990-1994 9.80E-06 1.32E-02
(-1.20E-06) (-1.31E-03)
1949-1994 3.38E-06 5.78E-03
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Table 3B 
Short-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods - Bayesian Estimation 
Average By Decade, Ball's Data Set 
Decade EKG_SR EKR_SR ELG_SR ELR_SR EMG_SR EMR_SR 
1949-1959 0.001024 -0.00314 -0.000064 0.000209 -0.055511 0.0165787 
(0.004361) (0.004948) (0.000521) (0.000369) (1.911529) (1.6393535)
1960-1969 0.001571 -0.010085 -0.000274 0.000395 0.227909 -0.201544 
(0.008291) (0.007133) (0.001304) (0.000703) (0.665811) (0.4454666)
1970-1979 0.004234 -0.022613 -0.000945 0.001136 0.351909 -0.398083 
(0.022389) (0.016082) (0.004381) (0.001967) (0.437095) (0.2141283)
1980-1989 0.009688 -0.073346 -0.002552 0.004348 0.319634 -2.875702 
(0.051173) (0.052028) (0.011634) (0.007419) (1.412777) (0.7075312)
1990-1994 0.01524 -0.144549 -0.004074 0.008698 1.854532 7.7162574 
(0.080443) (0.102555) (0.018737) (0.014966) (2.526301) (2.3555209)
1949-1994 0.0063514 -0.0507466 -0.0015818 0.0029572 0.5396946 0.8515014 
Table 4B 
Long-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods – Bayesian Estimation 
Average By Decade, Ball's Data Set 
Decade EKG_LR EKR_LR ELG_LR ELR_LR EMG_LR EMR_LR 
1949-1959 0.002857 -0.00876 0.000498 -0.00163 -0.01863 -0.01004 
(0.00027) (0.000829) (1.65E-05) (5.38E-05) (0.004214) (0.004425)
1960-1969 0.002366 -0.01567 0.001421 -0.00252 -0.01692 -0.03368 
(0.000284) (0.001882) (3.88E-05) (6.87E-05) (0.009149) (0.004084)
1970-1979 0.006648 -0.03662 0.00399 -0.00588 -0.06431 -0.17719 
(0.000803) (0.004426) (0.000134) (0.000198) (0.043828) (0.016638)
1980-1989 0.016232 -0.12677 0.00912 -0.01906 -1.1995 -2.01438 
(0.002087) (0.016297) (0.000295) (0.000617) (0.34993) (0.200925)
1990-1994 0.022502 -0.22018 0.015937 -0.04173 4.580564 6.403403 
(0.001775) (0.017371) (0.000547) (0.001433) (1.311022) (1.783446)
1949-1994 0.010121 -0.0816 0.0061932 -0.014164 0.6562408 0.8336226 
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Table 5B 
Adjusted Elsticity of Cost with Respect to Output - Bayesian Estimation 
Average By Decade, Ball's Data Set 
Decade cy cg gy cr ry Acy
1949-1959 2.08066 -0.01931 17.12097 -0.00999 0.74827 1.74257 
(0.088874) (0.005226) (11.76344) (0.005263) (39.3168) (0.444036)
1960-1969 2.278679 -0.02102 1.315998 -0.03838 2.884776 2.140291 
(0.112834) (0.009346) (7.227383) (0.005559) (31.79968) (1.553354)
1970-1979 2.581448 -0.07948 0.564339 -0.20971 1.486848 2.224795 
(0.155223) (0.048143) (3.099318) (0.028902) (16.38993) (3.945232)
1980-1989 10.46272 -2.54554 0.298008 -4.15066 0.553867 7.405213 
(40.29378) (13.01153) (1.63664) (15.19929) (6.105425) (93.66995)
1990-1994 -5.87366 3.100688 0.241997 4.283043 0.358983 -3.58576 
(0.954618) (0.679007) (1.329035) (0.609656) (3.95717) (17.70768)
1949-1994 2.3059694 0.0870676 3.9082624 -0.0251394 1.2065488 1.9854218 
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Table 1C 
Parameter Estimates, Thirtle Data Set 
 
Parameter Estimate t Value Parameter Estimate t Value
hk 0.001417 0.04ag 0.00002 0.3
bpkk -0.04502 -1.72ar -0.05677 -0.76
bplk 0.008142 1.13ay 6.531807 0.08
bpkL 0.239427 2.25bkk -86.4016 -3.49
bplL 0.096236 2.31bkL -2.65944 -0.52
bpkpk 25.33993 3.03bkg 0.000087 2.22
bpkpl -19.093 -2.01bkr -0.07408 -1.81
bplpl 0.192109 0.04bky -20.418 -0.75
nkg 4.55E-08 2.96bLL 1.130363 0.58
nkr -0.00013 -4.54bLg 8.44E-06 0.91
nky -0.02782 -1.1bLr -0.00531 -0.49
hl 0.171812 0.78bLy -2.48711 -0.31
nlg 6.24E-08 0.92bgg 1.74E-10 2.55
nlr -0.00016 -1.28bgr -3.32E-07 -2.41
nly 0.152884 1.09bgy -0.00004 -0.73
a0 -20.8604 -0.46brr 0.000489 2.06
ak 78.63147 2.14bry 0.098347 1.31
aL -0.62287 -0.05byy 2.780143 0.03
Equation Adj R-Sq. D-W     
Qk 0.9918 1.4279 
QL 0.9950 2.7824 
Qm 0.9950 1.9383 
Note: Bold numbers indicate parameter estimates that are significant at the 95% confidence level; 
Italic numbers indicate significance at the 90% level. 
Table 2C 
Shadow Prices based on ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade, Thirtle's Data Set 
Decade P*g P*r 
1926-1930 -4.24e-6 0.00463 
1931-1940 -3.989e-6 0.00443 
1941-1950 -2.935e-6 0.00246 
1951-1960 -1.172e-6 -0.00156 
1961-1970 -6.412e-7 0.00037 
1971-1980 -4.753e-6 0.00951 
1981-1990 -4.249e-6 0.01399 
1926-1990 -3.145e-6 0.00594 
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Table 3C 
Short-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods - ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade, Thirtle's Data Set 
Decade EKG_SR EKR_SR ELG_SR ELR_SR EMG_SR EMR_SR 
1926-1930 0.0033 -0.0123 0.0006 -0.0025 2.2684 -2.9337
1931-1940 0.0045 -0.0154 0.0008 -0.0032 1.1682 -1.3785
1941-1950 0.0081 -0.0300 0.0021 -0.0085 -0.8034 1.0344
1951-1960 0.0126 -0.0635 0.0057 -0.0318 -0.4568 0.8156
1961-1970 0.0250 -0.0725 0.0164 -0.0534 -1.3846 1.4364
1971-1980 0.0626 -0.0883 0.0625 -0.0990 7.4667 -3.9203
1981-1990 0.1397 -0.1940 0.1597 -0.2488 2.9476 -1.4184
1926-1990 0.0453 -0.0809 0.0188 -0.0377 38.5343 -24.2119
Table 4C 
Long-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods - ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade, Thirtle's Data Set 
Decade EKG_LR EKR_LR ELG_LR ELR_LR EMG_LR EMR_LR 
1926-1930 0.0054 -0.0204 0.0212 -0.0889 1.1519 -1.3853
1931-1940 0.0068 -0.0233 0.0278 -0.1066 1.4335 -1.5682
1941-1950 0.0144 -0.0534 0.0764 -0.3169 2.7147 -1.6468
1951-1960 0.0204 -0.1030 0.4183 -2.3584 -0.3330 3.5833
1961-1970 0.0374 -0.1088 0.7765 -2.5291 -0.2777 1.5915
1971-1980 0.0995 -0.1409 1.3877 -2.1984 1.9316 -1.7625
1981-1990 0.1626 -0.2260 -15.3559 23.9349 8.9254 -21.2764
1926-1990 0.0669 -0.1200 0.8779 -1.7622 1.2033 -0.8793
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Table 5C 
Adjusted Elsticity of Cost with Respect to Output 
ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade, Thirtle's Data Set 
Decade cy cg gy cr ry Acy 
1926-1930 0.1609 0.0539 3.6807 -0.0882 -1.9975 0.5353
1931-1940 0.1881 0.0683 2.8203 -0.1038 -1.6740 0.5544
1941-1950 0.2206 0.1149 1.6876 -0.1423 -0.9273 0.5465
1951-1960 0.5029 0.0068 1.0187 0.1806 -0.4115 0.4355
1961-1970 0.5002 0.0469 0.6079 -0.0314 -0.4251 0.5420
1971-1980 0.3892 0.5320 0.2539 -0.6017 -0.3651 0.7440
1981-1990 0.6525 0.9919 0.1363 -1.8172 -0.1992 1.1497
1926-1990 0.3642 0.3009 0.3323 -0.3767 -0.3771 0.6062
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Table 1D 
Bayesian Parameter Estimates, Thirtle's Data Set 
Parameter Estimate t Value Parameter Estimate t Value 
hk 0.1066235 31.48 ag -0.000024 -6.15
bpkk 0.1009183 26.22 ar 0.0153215 1.94
bplk 0.0120144 13.63 ay 15.432712 1.84
bpkL 0.0192183 11.03 bkk 6.8358263 0.89
bplL 0.1193447 13.27 bkL 0.7282358 0.99
bpkpk -2.699559 -1.80 bkg -1.83E-06 -0.35
bpkpl 1.2181477 1.53 bkr 0.0000836 0.03
bplpl -0.960255 -2.36 bky 2.5991692 0.65
nkg -7.86E-10 -0.46 bLL -0.886121 -2.76
nkr -2.82E-06 -0.64 bLg 1.20E-06 2.43
nky -0.00021 -0.06 bLr -0.003091 -1.97
hl 0.0298721 0.59 bLy -0.397538 -0.55
nlg -5.85E-09 -1.26 bgg -1.40E-11 -1.90
nlr -0.00001 -0.64 bgr -1.39E-09 -0.18
nly 0.0929988 2.05 bgy 0.0000299 5.75
a0 36.364902 7.60 brr 8.51E-07 0.08
ak -14.32086 -1.65 bry -0.01388 -1.90
aL -3.799932 -3.03 byy -5.387139 -0.51
Note: Bold numbers indicate parameter estimates that are significant at the 95% confidence 
level.
Table 2D 
Shadow Prices of Public Inputs 
Bayesian Estimates 
Average By Decade, Thirtle's Data Set 
Decade P*g P*r 
1926-1930     0.00000029 0.0001360 
(0.0000001)          (0.0000874) 
1931-1940     0.00000030 0.0000971 
(0.0000001)          (0.0000692) 
1941-1950     0.00000015 0.0001746 
(0.00000005) (0.0000853) 
1951-1960     0.00000013 0.0001343 
(0.0000001)          (0.0000886) 
1961-1970     0.00000011 0.0001665 
(0.0000001)          (0.0000741) 
1971-1980     0.00000040 0.0003225 
(0.0000002)          (0.0001730) 
1981-1990     0.00000112 0.0004988 
(0.0000004)          (0.0004166) 
1926-1990     0.00000037 0.0002415 
(0.0000001)          (0.0000669) 
Note: Standard Deviations between parentheses; 
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 95% confidence level.
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Table 3D 
Short-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods - Bayesian Estimation 
Average By Decade, Thirtle's Data Set 
Decade EKG_SR EKR_SR ELG_SR ELR_SR EMG_SR EMR_SR 
1926-1930 -0.000303 -0.000788 -0.000008 -0.000045 -0.025297 -0.087616
(0.000241) (0.001239) (0.000018) (0.000071) (0.015556) (0.104375)
1931-1940 -0.000405 -0.000963 -0.000012 -0.000059 -0.021028 -0.051758
(0.000321) (0.001515) (0.000026) (0.000092) (0.006811) (0.045632)
1941-1950 -0.000746 -0.001917 -0.000030 -0.000159 -0.012243 -0.064362
(0.000593) (0.003015) (0.000065) (0.000248) (0.006200) (0.040911)
1951-1960 -0.001158 -0.004048 -0.000084 -0.000605 -0.018778 -0.047929
(0.000920) (0.006368) (0.000182) (0.000944) (0.008694) (0.034736)
1961-1970 -0.002276 -0.004594 -0.000259 -0.001079 -0.024622 -0.007244
(0.001807) (0.007228) (0.000563) (0.001684) (0.016521) (0.024703)
1971-1980 -0.005817 -0.005711 -0.001105 -0.002239 -0.214746 -0.012528
(0.004617) (0.008985) (0.002420) (0.003496) (0.088516) (0.083936)
1981-1990 -0.012533 -0.012106 -0.002959 -0.005898 -1.505904 -0.125753
(0.009934) (0.019047) (0.006477) (0.009205) (0.566352) (0.403862)
1926-1990 -0.004123 -0.005129 -0.000284 -0.000728 -0.157398 -0.07149
(0.003272) (0.008069) (0.000616) (0.001137) (0.042998) (0.014500)
Note: Standard Deviations between parentheses; Bold numbers indicate significance at the 95% confidence 
level.
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Table 4D 
Long-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods- Bayesian Estimation 
Average By Decade, Thirtle's Data Set 
Decade EKG_LR EKR_LR ELG_LR ELR_LR EMG_LR EMR_LR 
1926-1930 0.000399 0.001036 0.000249 0.001383 -0.010098 -0.006118
(0.000035) (0.000092) (0.000443) (0.002465) (0.002184) (0.004153)
1931-1940 0.000527 0.001250 0.000324 0.001647 -0.012911 -0.004716
(0.000046) (0.000109) (0.000515) (0.002619) (0.002531) (0.003907)
1941-1950 0.001177 0.003016 0.000533 0.002926 -0.010616 -0.016435
(0.000081) (0.000208) (0.000174) (0.000956) (0.004750) (0.009278)
1951-1960 0.002358 0.008217 0.000890 0.006651 -0.013925 -0.022051
(0.000113) (0.000392) (0.000170) (0.001268) (0.010286) (0.025800)
1961-1970 0.004883 0.009828 0.001464 0.006317 -0.014217 -0.022907
(0.000156) (0.000314) (0.000089) (0.000383) (0.016842) (0.032717)
1971-1980 0.015060 0.014745 0.003572 0.007496 -0.194241 -0.065936
(0.000812) (0.000795) (0.000316) (0.000663) (0.130384) (0.092213)
1981-1990 0.034260 0.033003 0.007383 0.015245 -1.800040 -0.337914
(0.003132) (0.003017) (0.000675) (0.001393) (0.956503) (0.518025)
1926-1990 0.008171 0.010137 0.002774 0.007377 -0.143231 -0.048425
(0.000300) (0.000372) (0.000346) (0.000921) (0.052563) (0.044541)
Note: Standard Deviations between parentheses; Bold numbers indicate significance at the 95% confidence 
level.
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Table 5D 
Adjusted Elsticity of Cost with Respect to Output – Bayesian Estimation 
Average By Decade, Thirtle's Data Set 
Decade cy cg gy cr ry Acy 
1926-1930 0.2541744 -0.006194 31.703726 -0.004318 162.18955 -0.642471
(0.037726) (0.001260) (61.520560) (0.002779) (576.973190) (2.014419)
1931-1940 0.2520629 -0.008628 24.292787 -0.003765 135.91711 -0.469226
(0.03225640) (0.001607) (47.139755) (0.002680) 483.511600 (1.421129)
1941-1950 0.3007466 -0.006769 14.536020 -0.011658 75.291513 -0.675421
(0.049173) (0.002275) (28.206909) (0.005719) (267.842060) (2.765897)
1951-1960 0.3115221 -0.009544 8.7746229 -0.019486 33.4145 -0.423318
(0.052183) (0.004696) (17.027012) (0.012929) (118.868760) (2.006424)
1961-1970 0.3986176 -0.011685 5.2357006 -0.021509 34.515723 -0.404974
(0.066632) (0.006470) (10.159791) (0.009547) (122.786250) (2.240912)
1971-1980 0.6738808 -0.097684 2.187351 -0.044183 29.645173 -0.849587
(0.118328) (0.052232) (4.244519) (0.023146) (105.459750) (5.252431)
1981-1990 1.2376389 -0.586956 1.1740348 -0.145076 16.173215 -1.797815
(0.229472) (0.240920) (2.278195) (0.117257) (57.534601) (12.154252)
1926-1990 0.4678277 -0.067493 2.8619869 -0.031350 30.614636 -0.685106
(0.087865) (0.020796) (5.553639) (0.008366) (108.908520) (3.549299)
Note: Standard Deviations between parentheses; Bold numbers indicate significance at the 95% confidence level.
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Table 6.  Ball's vs Thirtle's ITSUR - Endogenous Growth Hypotheses 
Ball Thirtle
Positive shadows for public inputs No, infrastructure No, infastructure
Positive impact on private capital No, infrastructure No, research
Increasing returns to scale No Yes
Table 7.  Ball's vs Thirtle's Bayesian - Endogenous Growth Hypotheses 
Ball Thirtle
Positive shadows for public inputs Yes Yes
Positive impact on private capital No, research Yes
Increasing returns to scale No Yes (?)
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Table 8.  Ball's vs Thirtle's ITSUR violations
Ball Thirtle
Monotonicity No, G, 46/46 obs. No, R 10/65 obs., G 65/65 obs.
Concavity Yes No
Stability Yes No, one igenvalue
Euler No, K, 4/46 obs. No, K 45/65, L 47/65 obs.
Adjustment Cost No, K, 36/46 obs. No, K 41/65, L 25/65 obs.
Positive Marginal Cost No,1/46 obs. No, 25/65 obs.
Table 9. Ball's vs Thirtle's Bayesian violations
All conditions in all data points: parameter space empty
All conditions in 80% of data points: parameter space empty
Euler equations and adjustment costs conditions dropped
Ball Thirtle
Monotonicity No, J, 7/46 obs. Yes
    Mon. in public inputs imposed imposed
Concavity imposed imposed
Stability imposed Yes
Euler No, K 5/46 obs., L 17/46 obs. Yes
Adjustment Cost No, K 34/46 obs., L 43/46 obs. No, K 20/65 obs., L 55/65 obs.
Positive Marginal Cost imposed Yes
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Table 10 
 
Estimated Speed of Adjustment  
NLITSUR K-K* L-L*  
Ball's Data Set ('48-'94) K -0.092 -0.164
L 0.049 -0.195
Thirtle's Data Set ('25-'90) 1967=1 K 0.095 -0.008
(It is not stable) L -0.239 -0.046
MH Estimation K-K* L-L*  
Ball's Data Set ('48-'94) K -0.203 0.053
L -0.416 -0.129
Thirtle's Data Set ('25-'90) 1967=1 K -0.051 -0.012
L -0.019 -0.069
Estimated Speed of Adjustment - Other Studies  
K-K* L-L* Land-Land* 
Vasavada & Cambers (1986) K -0.12 0.05 -0.02
1947-1979 L 0.22 -0.07 -0.34
Land -0.02 0.07 -0.59
Luh and Stefanou (1991) - 1950-1982 K -0.13 0.01 -- 
L 0.29 -0.13 -- 
K -0.15 0 -- Imposing Independent Adjustment 
L 0 -0.11 -- 
Luh and Stefanou (1993) - 1950-1982 K -0.83 0.01 -- 
L 0.84 -0.11 -- 
K -0.99 0 -- Imposing Independent Adjustment 
L 0 -0.11 -- 
Luh and Stefanou (1996) - 1948-1982 K -0.34 -0.24 -- 
CVW L -0.36 -0.45 -- 
Luh and Stefanou (1996) - 1948-1987 K -0.33 0.02 -- 
USDA L -0.03 -0.27 -- 
K -0.35 0 -- Imposing Independent Adjustment 
L 0 -0.26 -- 
K -0.44 0 -- Imposing Independent Adjustment and static expectations
L 0 -0.33 -- 
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APPENDIX 1 
This appendix presents conditions (A) and (B) that guarantee duality between cost and value functions 
of the firms. 
 
Conditions (A) 
It is assumed that C(y, Z, I; G) satisfies the following set of regularity conditions: 
(A.1) C(y, Z, I; G)  0. 
(A.2) C(y, Z, I; G) is increasing in y and decreasing in Z. Additionally, CI > 0 when I > 0 and vice versa, 
which follows from the assumption of adjustment costs. 
(A.3) C(y, Z, I; G) is convex in I. 
(A.4) For each (Z0, y, p; G) a unique solution exists for (1). This means that there are well-defined factor 
demand functions associated with (1). 
(A.5) For each (Z0, y, p; G), problem (1) has a unique steady state (SS) stock )G;p,y(Z
_
that is globally 
stable. This condition establishes the uniqueness and stability of the steady state. 
(A.6) For any (Z0, y, p; G), there exists p
^
such that I
^
is the optimal gross investment vector at t = 0 in (1) 
given (Z0, y, p; G). 
 
Conditions (B) 
It is assumed that the value function J(Z, y, p; G) satisfies the following properties: 
(B.1) J(Z, y, p; G)  0. 
(B.2)   (i)  0)G;p,y,Z(*Z)G;p,y,Z(Jp)G;p,y,Z(J)ru( zzz <+
•
, where u is an identity matrix. 
This expression is dual  to Cz < 0. 
(ii)  Jz(Z, y, p; G) < 0 when Z)G;p,y,Z(*Z)G;p,y,Z(*I +
•
> 0 and vice versa. This condition is 
dual to CI > 0 when I > 0 and vice versa. 
 (iii) 0)Gp;y,Z,(*Z)Gp;y,Z,(J)Gp;y,Z,(J 'yzy >
•
, where 
]Z)Gp;y,Z,(J)[Gp;y,Z,(J)G;p,y,Z(*Z p1pz = 
•
. This condition is dual to Cy > 0. 
(B.3) The following expression is concave in p: 
)G;p,y,Z(*Z)G;p,y,Z(JZ'p)G;p,y,Z(J 'z
•
Under some specific functional forms (like the normalized quadratic presented above), Jz(Z, y, p; G) is 
linear in p and the curvature requirement reduces to concavity of J(Z, y, p; G) in p. This condition is 
dual to (A.3). 
(B.4) The demand for the variable input, X*(Z, y, p; G), is positive. 
(B.5) The stock Z that solves ]Z)Gp;y,Z,(J)[Gp;y,Z,(J)Gp;y,Z,(*Z p1pz = 
•
, with Z(0) > 0, 
has a unique globally stable steady state )G;p,y(Z
_
.
Then, under conditions (A) and (B), duality between C(y, Z, I; G.) and J(Z, y, p; G) can be established 
as in equations (2) and (3). The following derivative properties then hold: 
 
Derivative Properties 
 
1. With respect to I: 
CI(y, Z, I; G) = - Jz(Z, y, p; G). From (A.2) or (B.2.ii), this expression must be positive when I > 0 and vice 
versa. 
Testing for Jz(Z, y, p; G) = 0 is equivalent to testing for adjustment costs in inputs Z. 
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2. With respect to Z: 
0)G;p,y,Z(*Z)G;p,y,Z(Jp)G;p,y,Z(J)u()G;I,Z,y(C zzzz <+=
•
from (A.2). 
This expression gives the shadow price of quasi-fixed inputs. 
 
3. With respect to y: 
0)G;p,y,Z(*Z)G;p,y,Z(J)G;p,y,Z(J)G;I,Z,y(C 'zyyy >=
•
from (A.2). 
This expression represents the output supply of the firms. 
 
4. With respect to p: 
)G;p,y,Z(*Z)G;p,y,Z(JZ)G;p,y,Z(J0 zpp
•=
Then, 
]Z)G;p,y,Z(J)[G;p,y,Z(J)G;p,y,Z(*Z p1pz = 
•
, which is the dynamic demand for Z. 
 
5. With respect to G: 
)G;p,y,Z(*Z)G;p,y,Z(J)G;p,y,Z(J)G;I,Z,y(C ZGGG
•=
This expression represents the shadow price of G when the firms are out of the SS. At the SS, the shadow 
price is 
)G;p,y,Z(J)G;I,Z,y(C GG =
If this expression is negative, the shadow price of G is positive, meaning that public inputs reduce cost of 
production. 
 
APPENDIX 2 
This appendix presents conditions (C) to (D) that guarantee duality between the value function of the 
firms and the value function of the government. 
 
Conditions (C) 
It is assumed that J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) satisfies the following conditions: 
(C.1) J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig)  0
(C.2) (i) J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is increasing in Ig. Given that J(y, Z, p; G) is independent of Ig, AC(Ig) must 
be increasing in Ig.
(ii) J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is decreasing in G. Given that AC(Ig) is independent of G, J(y, Z, p; G) must 
be decreasing in G. 
(C.3) J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is convex in Ig. Then, AC(Ig) must be convex in Ig.
(C.4) For each (Z, p, y, r, G0), there exists a unique solution for (8). This means that there are well-defined 
supplies of public inputs. 
(C.5) For each (Z, p, y, r, G0), (8) has a unique steady state stock )r,y,p,Z(G
_
that is globally stable. 
(C.6) For any (Z, p, y, r, G0), there exists 
^
r such that g
^
I is the optimal public gross investment vector at t = 0 
in (8), given (Z, p, y, r, G0). 
 
Conditions (D) 
It is assumed that Jg(y, Z, p; r, G) satisfies the following conditions: 
(D.1) Jg(y, Z, p; r, G)  0
(D.2) (i) 0)Gr,p;Z,y,(JgG < . This condition is dual to (C.2)(i) and means that there are adjustment costs 
in the provision of public inputs. 
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(ii) 0G)Gr,p;Z,y,(J)Gr,p;Z,y,(J)u( *gGGgGg <+
•
. This expression is dual to (C.2)(ii): 
0)Gr,p;Z,y,(JG < (positive shadow prices of public inputs). Given 
0)Gr,p;Z,y,(JgG < , it is sufficient for (D.2)(ii) to hold that 0)Gr,p;Z,y,(JgGG < (that 
is, increases of the public good decrease the shadow price of it). 
(D.3) *G)G,r,p,y,Z('JG'r)G,r,p,y,Z(J gGg
•
  must be concave in r. This is dual to condition 
(C.3). 
(D.4) G)Gr,p;Z,y,(*G)Gr,p;Z,y,(I g*g +
•
is positive. 
(D.5) The stocks G that solve ]G)Gr,p;Z,y,(J)[Gr,p;Z,y,(J)Gr,p;Z,y,(*G gr1gGr = 
•
,
with G(0) > 0, has a unique globally stable steady state )r;y,p,Z(G
_
.
Then, under conditions (C) and (D), duality between Jg(y, Z, p; r, G) and J(y, Z, p; r, G) +AC(Ig) can be 
established as in equations (9) and (10). The derivative properties presented below then hold. 
 
Derivative Properties 
 
1. With respect to Ig:
)Gr,y;Z,p,(JAC0 gGIg +=
or 
0AC)Gr,y;Z,p,(J
gI
g
G >= ,
This is positive given ACIg > 0. 
 
2. With respect to G: 
)Gr,y;Z,p,(JG)Gr,y;Z,p,(Jr)G;p,y,Z(J)Gr,y;Z,p,(J gGg*gGGGgG ++=
•

or 
•
+= *gGGgGgG G)Gr,y;Z,p,(Jr)Gr,y;Z,p,(J)u()G;p,y,Z(J
This expression is the firms’ willingness to pay for G (shadow price) when the firms are at the steady state. 
If the expression is negative (condition (D.2)(ii)), then public inputs reduce cost of production. When the 
government is also at the SS, that expression can be rewritten as 
)r)G;p,y,Z(J()u()Gr,y;Z,p,(J G1ggG += 
which could be interpreted as a ‘social’ shadow price: the net social benefit (the firms’ shadow price of G 
minus the government’s cost of providing G) adjusted by the ‘social’ discount rate plus the depreciation rate 
of public inputs. 
 
3. With respect to r: 
•
 += *gGrgr G)Gr,y;Z,p,(JG)Gr,y;Z,p,(J
or 
]G)Gr,y;Z,p,(J)[Gr,y;Z,p,(JG gr1gGr* = 
•
which gives the optimal path of G. 
 
4. With respect to Z: 
•
 += *gGzzgz G)Gr,y;Z,p,(J)G;p,y,Z(J)Gr,y;Z,p,(J
or 
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0G)Gr,y;Z,p,(J)Gr,y;Z,p,(J)G;p,y,Z(J *gGzgzz <=
•

where the sign is given by condition B.2(ii): the value function of the firm is decreasing in Z. 
 
5. With respect to y: 
•
 += *gGyygy G)Gr,y;Z,p,('J)G;p,y,Z(J)Gr,y;Z,p,(J
or 
0G)Gr,y;Z,p,('J)Gr,y;Z,p,(J)G;p,y,Z(J *gGygyy >=
•

where the sign is given by condition B.2(iii): the value function of the firm is increasing in y. Finally, at the 
SS level of G (or with no adjustment cost of G), 
0)Gr,y;Z,p,(J)G;p,y,Z(J gyy >= 
The appendices below can be requested from the author or found for the next 15 days at: 
ftp.ianr.unl.edu
APPENDIX 3. Bayesian Estimation. 
APPENDIX 4.Data set (see below) 
APPENDIX 5. Additional Diagnostics and Potential Extensions of this Analysis. 
APPENDIX 6. Unit root tests 
APPENDIX 7. SAS code used in estimation. 
APPENDIX 8. Reviewers’ comments as of February 21, 2006 (Prof. Alvarez, Prof. Buccola, Prof. Førsund, 
Prof. Thirtle, Prof. Karagiannis, Prof. Tsionas) 
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APPENDIX 4. Data Sets
(complete data set and graphs in excel file Appendix 4)
BALL's
Period: 1948-1994
Quantity Indexes: 1987=1
Implicit Price Indexes
Output Materials Labor Capital+Land Infrast.Stock
R&D Stock (exp.
from
Alston+Pardey)
year Qy Pm Qm PL QL Qkland Pkland G R
Mean 0.778 47874 0.893 17462 1.759 1.013 32027 1167226 971
StDev 0.195 25745 0.152 14261 0.700 0.099 28577 1088268 1078
Max 1.198 91902 1.165 51974 3.304 1.182 95942 3568275 3744
Min 0.502 22413 0.574 3797 0.937 0.688 3819 126061 103
THIRTLE's
Period: 1925-1990
Quantity Indexes: 1967=1
Implicit Price Indexes
Output Fertilizers Labor Capital+Land Infrast.Stock R&D Stock
Year Qy Pm Qm PL QL Qk Pk G R
Mean 0.883 26656 0.734 19333 1.805 0.908 18226 651309 467.0
StDev 0.287 10779 0.656 19714 1.027 0.183 18204 850450 432.3
Max 1.420 52670 1.961 69571 3.400 1.218 58241 2966789 1574.3
Min 0.430 14428 0.050 1827 0.524 0.605 3627 32194 42.0
